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The theme of this article is that competition, here modeled 
as the movement of goods between two areas, reduces re-
sistance to new technology and, hence, leads to increased 
technology adoption and wealth. The article develops a 
model in which the extension of markets leads to reduc-
tions in activities that block new technologies. 
Why build a model that has a new role for competition 
in creating wealth? As an empirical matter, the introduc-
tion of markets brings tremendous increases in wealth. 
(See, for example, Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986.) This has 
been observed over and over and is again being witnessed, 
for example, in Southeast China. However, there is still 
plenty of uncertainty among economists as to why compe-
tition, or the extension of markets, has been so successful 
in creating wealth. Two mechanisms are clearly at work: 
the extension of markets leads to increases in specializa-
tion and facilitates comparative advantage. But it is not 
clear that these mechanisms alone account for the tremen-
dous success of markets. Other mechanisms may be as, or 
even more, important. 
Why introduce the particular mechanism we explore— 
that an extension of markets leads to reductions in resis-
tance to new technology? Our motivation here is also pri-
marily empirical, that is, based on observation. We no-
ticed a large number of industries in which the extent of 
the market for the industry's good explained, in large part, 
the degree to which new ways of producing the good 
were resisted. Below, we present a few brief industry case 
studies—for the construction, automobile, and dairy indus-
tries—that make this point. The U.S. construction industry 
is one in which, because of the nontransportable nature of 
the good, the extent of the market is narrow. Given this, 
we are not surprised by the significant resistance to new 
production techniques that is found in this industry. 
Though the auto industry is one in which the good can be 
moved across areas, the industry in the United States has 
been relatively more open to competition than has the Eu-
ropean car industry. In our view (and in the view of in-
dustry observers), the more rapid adoption of Japanese 
lean production methods in the United States is due to 
greater resistance to these methods in Europe that resulted 
from the European car market being relatively more closed 
to competition—that is, to Japanese cars. The final exam-
ple we discuss below is one in which resistance to a new 
technology in the U.S. dairy industry—namely, the use of 
a growth hormone genetically engineered to increase the 
milk production of cows—failed because the extent of the 
market was too great. 
The model we develop is a simple general equilibrium 
model that determines the extent of resistance to new tech-
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nology at each of a number of (usually two) locations or 
areas. We ask how the extent of resistance depends on the 
extent of markets. By extent of markets, we simply mean 
whether or not goods can move between the two areas. 
In the model, the sources of resistance to new technol-
ogy are groups of individuals who stand to lose rents if a 
new technology is introduced. In the real world, these rents 
take a number of forms: for example, returns to skills in 
a technology that is less efficient than the new one or re-
turns to a privileged position granted, say, by the govern-
ment. In the model, we take the rents to be returns to skills 
in a less efficient technology. Hence, we use the term 
skilled groups to refer to the people who stand to lose rents 
if the new technology is adopted. We assume that the 
skilled groups can use a regulatory/political process to at-
tempt to block the new technology. To keep matters as 
simple as possible, that process is largely kept in the back-
ground in this article. We assume the process is such that 
the skilled groups have the means, at certain resource 
costs, of constructing barriers to the efficient technology. 
We first study a single area, area A, showing that under 
some conditions skilled groups erect barriers to new tech-
nology. We then study a two-area world. To make our ar-
gument as simply as possible, we study a world in which 
the two areas, areas A and B, are identical in all respects 
except that in area B the costs to blocking technology are 
prohibitively expensive. Hence, blocking does not happen 
in area B. If markets are limited—that is, if goods do not 
move between A and B—then under some conditions (the 
same conditions as above) the new technology is blocked 
in A. If the technology is blocked in A, then we show that 
if there is an extension of markets—that is, if goods do 
move between A and B—the resistance to new technology 
in area A is broken (under some conditions). 
The argument for why resistance is broken is simple. 
To be concrete, it might be helpful to think of area A as 
Europe and B as Japan. Suppose the new technology is the 
lean production methods used in the auto industry. Sup-
pose initially that A, or Europe, is closed to Japanese auto 
imports and that it bans the use of lean production in its 
factories (through rigid work-rule laws, for example). Now 
suppose that trade with B, or Japan—which by assumption 
has no barriers to lean production—is introduced. With the 
extension of markets, cars produced with the more efficient 
technology in Japan will be exported to Europe. The ex-
ported cars will displace the cars produced in Europe with 
the inefficient technology. Hence, those with a vested in-
terest in the inferior technology in Europe will gain noth-
ing from the rigid work-rule laws. Therefore, the exten-
sion of markets diminishes the incentive to keep the work-
rule laws. The model, then, makes clear that competition 
can reduce resistance to technology. 
The idea that competition may reduce resistance to new 
technology is not, of course, new. For example, Olson 
(1982, especially chap. 5) has discussed how trade and 
factor mobility may limit the effectiveness of special inter-
est groups. And it has long been recognized that special in-
terest groups may attempt to block new technology; since 
the 19th century, for example, the word Luddite has been 
used to refer to such a group. (For an extensive discussion 
of resistance to new technology, see Mokyr 1990.) What 
is new in this article is an exploration, in a formal model, 
of the link between how easily goods move between areas 
and whether or not special interest groups resist new tech-
nology. Before we can provide answers to such quantita-
tive questions as why markets have been so successful in 
creating wealth, we must develop formal models. 
A property of competition, then, is that it reduces resis-
tance to new technology. But why, then, would skilled 
groups ever agree to an extension of markets, as they 
sometimes do? (Witness the recent increase in the number 
of regional free-trade zones.) It turns out that this question 
too can be understood in the context of the model. To see 
the answer suggested by the model sketched above, con-
sider the interest of a particular skilled group in promoting 
competition. Competition will break its barrier to new tech-
nology, clearly a bad prospect for the group, everything 
else equal. But competition will have the same effect on 
the barriers of other skilled groups. They, too, will reduce 
their resistance to new technology. For the original group, 
that is a good prospect, everything else equal. The second 
effect may be so good that it offsets the losses from the 
first effect of competition, that is, from its influence on the 
skilled group's own barrier. If the second effect dominates, 
then all groups can agree to extend markets and competi-
tion. This analysis leads to the conclusion that competition, 
or extension of markets, may be an efficient way to com-
mit to removing barriers to new technology. 
We study this second question—Why does competition 
spread?—in a slightly different model than the first. In this 
second model, areas A and B are identical in all respects, 
including their resistance technologies. In this setup, we 
ask, When will skilled groups in the two areas vote to al-
low goods to move between areas? 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. 
We begin by discussing the model environment. We then 
3 discuss the equilibrium and the resistance to new technol-
ogy in a one-area world. After this, we show that an ex-
tension of markets reduces resistance to new technology. 
After this, we show that under some conditions all skilled 
groups can agree to an extension of markets. This material 
completes the formal presentation of the model. We then 
turn to discuss the examples mentioned above. The final 
section presents some discussion of related literature and 
future research. 
The Model Environment 
In this section, we describe the one-area world. We begin 
with a very brief overview of the model. We then describe 
preferences, endowments, and technologies. Finally, we 
give a formal statement of the timing of events. 
An Overview 
In the model economy, there are two periods. At the start 
of the first period, there is a technology—the old technol-
ogy—for producing each good. Some individuals are 
skilled in the old technology. During the first period, an-
other technology for producing each good becomes avail-
able—the new technology. This technology can be adopt-
ed at zero cost. Skilled groups decide whether or not to 
resist the new technology. After this decision, the model 
economy enters the second period, during which goods 
are produced. The goods are produced with the old tech-
nology and, if it has not been blocked, the new technolo-
gy-
Preferences 
Individuals in the model consume k + 2 goods. There are 
three types of goods. One is food. We denote the quantity 
of food by the variable x. Next, there are k manufactured 
goods. We denote the quantity of manufactured good i by 
the variable yif i = 1 The last good is leisure. We de-
note quantities of leisure by the variable 0. 
All individuals in the economy have the same utility 
function over commodity bundles, given by 
(1) U(x,yi,y2,...,yk, C) = M*,)0P(C)] 
= (x
aM--$)W)] 
where a > 0, (3 > 0, a + k$ = 1, and h(Q) is strictly in-
creasing. The utility function is the product of a term that 
depends on the consumption of food and manufactured 
goods and a term that depends on leisure. The utility of 
goods consumption is Cobb-Douglas. The k manufactured 
goods enter symmetrically in the utility function. 
Endowments 
There is a unit measure of individuals in the economy. 
Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor in each 
period. In period 1, the endowment is used for either lei-
sure or resistance activities. The nature of resistance activ-
ities is described later. In period 2, the endowment is used 
to produce either food or manufactured goods. 
Individuals are also endowed with skills for producing 
goods. Everyone is assumed to have the same skill in pro-
ducing food, but to differ in their skill for producing man-
ufactured goods. It will be simpler to describe these skills 
after the production functions are introduced. 
Technology 
• Production 
Let / denote the input of labor into the production of 
goods. We assume that the production of food takes place 
under constant returns to scale. We also normalize units 
so that one unit of labor produces one unit of food; that is, 
x = /. 
Next, consider the production functions for manufac-
tured goods. As suggested above, there is initially an old 
technology for producing each manufactured good /. Some 
people are skilled in the old technology for producing good 
i; others are unskilled. The output of an unskilled laborer 
using the old technology is yt = /. The output of a skilled 
laborer using the old technology is y{ = 6/, where 9 > 1. 
As also mentioned above, a new technology for produc-
ing good i becomes available during the first period. Since 
the technology is new, all individuals are unskilled in this 
method. The output of an unskilled laborer using the new 
technology is yt = y/, where y > 1. We assume that y > 0. 
This condition says that a unit of unskilled labor applied 
to the new technology is more productive than a unit of 
skilled labor applied to the old technology. Finally, we as-
sume that all manufactured goods have the same produc-
tion possibilities. (That is, neither 6 nor y is indexed by /.) 
We now describe the endowments of skills in the old 
technologies. Some individuals are unskilled in the old 
technology for each good /. We call this group of individ-
uals the unskilled group. Those not in this group are in the 
skilled group. A member of the skilled group is skilled in 
producing only one of the manufactured goods. The group 
of individuals skilled in producing good i we call skilled 
group i. We assume that the fraction of the population in 
skilled group i is the same for all i and denote this fraction 
as r\. Hence, kr\ is the fraction of the population that be-
longs to some skilled group. Let X = kr\. Then the fraction 
of the population in the unskilled group is 1 - X. 
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• Resistance 
Skilled group i has the ability to construct a barrier to the 
new technology for producing good /, meaning that no in-
dividual can use the new technology (including the mem-
bers of skilled group /). We now describe the process by 
which barriers to new technology are erected. The mem-
bers of skilled group i decide, as a group, whether or not to 
engage in resistance activity to block the new technology. 
We denote the action taken by group i as aif a{ e [b,n), 
where al - b means that the skilled group erects a barrier 
(b for barrier) to the new technology and al = n means that 
the skilled group does not erect a barrier (n for no barrier). 
The members of skilled group i must spend resources 
to block the new technology. We assume that the group 
must spend a total of p units of labor endowment in order 
to block the technology. Let r = p/r|. Then if each mem-
ber of skilled group i contributes r units of labor endow-
ment, the new technology is blocked. We assume that the 
group can act collectively in getting its members to con-
tribute to the common cause. Since each individual is en-
dowed with one unit of labor in period 1, an individual's 
leisure is 6 = 1 if no barrier is erected and f = 1 - r oth-
erwise. (We assume that r < 1.) 
Timing of Events 
We now describe the sequence of events in the model. 
There are two periods. In the first period, a new technolo-
gy becomes available. Each skilled group i chooses to erect 
a barrier or not; that is, it chooses at e {b,n}. Each skilled 
group i makes its choice to maximize the utility of the indi-
viduals in skilled group i. The choices al are made simul-
taneously. In the second period, all agents in the economy 
act competitively. The nature of the competitive equilibri-
um in the second period depends on the extent of resis-
tance in the first period. This completes the description of 
the one-area world. We analyze this world in the next 
section. 
The One-Area World 
To keep matters simple, we begin with the case of a sin-
gle manufacturing good (k = 1). To show that competition 
reduces resistance to new technology, it will suffice to 
have k = 1. Later, to show that skilled groups may agree 
to an extension of markets, it will be necessary to have 
many manufactured goods (k > 1). 
Recall the timing of events from above. In the first pe-
riod, the skilled group chooses whether or not to erect a 
barrier to the new technology; that is, it chooses a e {b,n}. 
In the second period, there is a competitive equilibrium. 
In order to study this situation, we work backward in time. 
First, we define and calculate the competitive equilibrium 
in the second period. We calculate the second-period equi-
librium for the case in which the barrier is constructed as 
well as for the case in which the barrier is not constructed. 
Let v
h denote the utility of the representative skilled 
individual in the barrier case and v
n the utility in the no-
barrier case. Second, given the values of v
b and v
n, we 
turn to the analysis of the first-period problem of the 
skilled group. The decision is simple: the skilled group 
chooses to erect a barrier if and only if v
b > v
n. 
Equilibrium With a Barrier. . . 
Suppose the new technology has been blocked during the 
first period; that is, a = b. The first step is to define a com-
petitive equilibrium of the economy. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that all individuals of the same skill lev-
el behave the same way.
1 Individuals allocate their unit 
second-period labor endowment between the production of 
food and the production of the single manufactured good. 
Let ms denote the units of labor allocated to the manufac-
tured good by an individual with skill level s, where s = 
L denotes an unskilled, or tow-skill, individual and s - H 
a skilled, or high-skill, individual. The units of labor allo-
cated to food production is the residual 1 - ms of the unit 
labor endowment. Regarding consumption, let de-
note food and manufactured good consumption of an indi-
vidual with skill level s. 
Let food be the numeraire, and let p denote the price of 
the manufactured good in terms,of food. A competitive 







 satisfying three conditions: 




 maximizes type H's utility; 
that is, it solves this problem: 
(2) max(m^y)[u(x,y)][hH] 
subject to 
(3) x + p
by < (1 -m) + p
bQm 
(4) 0 < m < 1 
because of the linearity of the production function, there may exist multiple equi-
libria regarding the allocation of production tasks. We can assume that the representa-
tive individual of a given skill level produces the average of the set of individuals of 
that skill level. Because of the strict concavity of the utility function, the consumption 
bundle for an individual is the same across any multiple equilibria that exist. 
5 where hH = h(l-r). (Recall that each high-skill indi-
vidual has to allocate r units of his or her leisure en-
dowment to erect the barrier.) 




b) maximizes type L's utility. 
[The utility-maximizing problem of type L is the same 
as that for H except that 9 is replaced with 1 and hH 
with hL = h(l).] 








b = (1 -X)m
bL + XQm
b. 
It is easy to show that there is a unique equilibrium. 
The following proposition characterizes some properties 
of the equilibrium. In order to state the proposition, we 
define two critical values of X, X' and A", where X' = 
(l-a)/(l-a+oc9) and V = 1 - a (so that 0 < X' < X" < 1). 
PROPOSITION 1. There is a unique equilibrium. IfX<X', 
then m
bH-\ and m
hL e (0,1). The price of the manufac-
tured good is p
b - 1. If X' < X < X", then m
bH = 1 and 
m
b = 0. The price of the manufactured good is p
b € 
(1/9,1). Finally, ifX > X", then m
b e (0,1) and m
bL = 0. 
The price of the manufactured good is p
b = 1/9. 
Before we discuss this proposition, there are two things 
to recognize. First, skilled individuals have the same pro-
ductivity in food production as do unskilled individuals, 
but the skilled have a higher productivity in manufactured 
good production. Hence, skilled individuals have a com-
parative advantage in the production of manufactures; un-
skilled individuals, in the production of food. This means 
skilled individuals work relatively more in the production 
of the manufactured good. Second, the degree of special-
ization depends on X, the fraction of skilled workers in the 
population. 
Suppose, then, that X is very small. Then unskilled 
workers cannot completely specialize in the production of 
food because there is an insufficient number of skilled 
workers to accommodate the demand of unskilled workers 
for the manufactured good. Hence, in the equilibrium allo-
cation, unskilled individuals produce both food and the 
manufactured good while the skilled individuals complete-
ly specialize in manufacturing. That is, m
hH - 1 and m
bL e 
(0,1). Since unskilled individuals produce both goods, they 
must receive the same income per unit of labor in both 
production activities. The income per unit of labor in food 
is 1. The income per unit of labor in manufactures is p
b. 
Equilibrium requires that these two returns be equal; hence, 
P»=i. 
By analogous reasoning, if X is close to 1, then skilled 
individuals produce both food and the manufactured good, 
while the unskilled individuals completely specialize in 
food production. That is, m
bH e (0,1) and m
b = 0. Here, 
the price of the manufactured good equals the marginal 
rate of transformation between the two goods for the 
skilled individuals; that is, p
b= 1/9. 
Finally, if X' < X < X", then skilled individuals com-
pletely specialize in manufacturing while the unskilled in-
dividuals completely specialize in food production. That 
is, m
bH - 1 and m
bL = 0. The equilibrium price declines 
monotonically from p
b = 1 at X = X' to p
b = 1/9 at X = X". 
That is, the price lies between the marginal rates of trans-
formation of the two skill levels. The equilibrium price 
equates the demand for the manufactured good by the un-
skilled individuals with the supply from the skilled indi-
viduals. 
The equilibrium utility v
h of the representative skilled 
individual depends upon the equilibrium price of the man-
ufactured good, and this, in turn, depends upon the frac-
tion X of skilled individuals in the population. Chart 1 plots 
equilibrium utility v
b as a function of X. In the case where 
X is less than X', price is constant at 1, so utility does not 
change with X. In the range between X and X", the price 
declines and the utility of the skilled individuals falls along 
with it. For A. above X", the price is constant at its mini-
mum point of p
b = 1/9. The utility of the representative 
skilled individual is constant at its minimum point. 
. . . And Without a Barrier 
Now suppose the new technology was not blocked in the 
first period; that is, a = n. Recall that the new technology 
with unskilled labor input is more productive than the old 
technology with skilled input; that is, y > 9. The old tech-
nology will not be used, so possession of high skill for the 
old technology is irrelevant. All individuals in the econo-
my are equal in that they are all unskilled in the new tech-
nology. 
Given that all individuals are alike, it is easy to define 
equilibrium. We will not do that here, but will rather state 
some of the properties of equilibrium. The equilibrium 
price of the manufactured good is the marginal rate of 
transformation between the two goods; that is, p
n = 1/y. 
All individuals in the economy have an income of one 
unit of food. This follows because each individual is indif-
ferent, in equilibrium, to allocating his or her entire unit la-
bor endowment to the production of a unit of food. Final-
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ly, the utility v
n does not depend on X, as shown in Chart 
1. 
Conditions for Resistance 
We have completed the analyses of second-period equilib-
rium when there is a barrier—that is, when a = b—and 
when there is no barrier—that is, when a-n. We are now 
in a position to state conditions under which the represen-
tative skilled individual is better off with a barrier than 
without one (the conditions which permit us to draw Chart 
1 as we did, that is, with v
b above v
n for small X). 
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that 0 > y
1_
a
 For small enough 
r, there exists a point Xe (X,X"), such that ifX<%, then 
v
b > v
n, while ifX>%, then v
b < v
n. 
This is illustrated in Chart 1. The proof of this proposi-
tion is in the Appendix. Here, let us describe the intuition 
behind this result. Erecting a barrier increases the price of 
the manufactured good, and it also means that a skilled in-
dividual has a lower productivity in producing manufac-
tured goods. This has two effects on the utility of a skilled 
individual: one in the individual's role as consumer, the 
other in his or her role as producer. As a consumer, an in-
dividual is, of course, hurt by higher prices. For example, 
if X < X\ then erecting a barrier increases the price from 
p
n = l/y to p
b = 1. The increase in price is smaller the 
larger is X. If X > then the price increases from p
n = 
l/y to p
b = 1/0. As a producer, the individual is typically 
helped by higher prices but hurt by lower productivity. On 
balance, erecting a barrier increases income (or leaves it 
unchanged). This has a positive effect on utility. If X < X\ 
then erecting a barrier increases the income of a skilled in-
dividual from p"y = 1 to p
bQ = 0, where 0 > 1. The in-
crease in income is smaller the larger is XlfX> X", then 
there is no increase in income. 
Given these effects, it is clear that if X > X", then the 
skilled group chooses not to erect a barrier. If a barrier is 
erected, then the price of the manufactured good increases, 
yet there is no increase in income. But if X < X\ then 
erecting a barrier results in both higher prices and income. 
Which effect, the price or income effect, dominates de-
pends on other parameters of the model. If the share of 
food in the budget is large (that is, if a is large), then the 
increase in the price of the manufactured good is of small 
consequence. The income effect dominates. This is the log-
ic behind the condition 0 > y
1_
a
 stated in the proposition. 
How Competition Reduces Resistance 
We now show how the extension of markets reduces re-
Charts 1 and 2 
When Will New Technology Be Resisted? 
Equilibrium Utility of Skilled Workers as a Function 
of the Fraction of the Population Skilled 
Chart 1 In a World With One Area ... 
X" X X' 1 Fraction of 
Population 
Skilled (X) 
Chart 2 ... And With Two Areas 
(Under a Consumption Barrier) 
XXX X' 1 Fraction of 
Population 
Skilled (\) 
7 sistance to new technology. We consider an environment 
in which there are two areas. The first area, area A, is iden-
tical to the area in the analysis above. The second area, ar-
ea B, is identical to that above except that resistance costs 
in B are extremely high—so high that there are never bar-
riers to new technology in area B. In this section we ask, 
What happens in area A if there is an extension of mar-
kets, that is, if the markets in A and B are integrated, or 
the two areas form a free-trade union? In particular, we ask 
whether or not the skilled group in A will choose to erect 
a barrier given the extension of markets. We compare this 
choice to that made when markets are limited, that is, the 
outcome in the preceding section. 
We assume that the shipment of goods between the two 
areas involves no resource costs, but that labor is immo-
bile. 
It will be of interest to consider two types of barriers to 
new technology in this section. One, a production barrier 
in an area, makes it impossible for any worker to use the 
new technology in the area. The other, a consumption bar-
rier in an area, makes it illegal to sell goods in the area 
that are produced with the new technology. In a one-area 
world, a consumption barrier has the same effect as a pro-
duction barrier. (There is no point to producing a good if 
its sale is illegal.) In a two-area world, a consumption bar-
rier is not the same as a production barrier. 
Production Barriers 
We have the following proposition concerning production 
barriers: 
PROPOSITION 3. If a > 1/2, then the skilled group in area 
A does not erect a production barrier when there is an ex-
tension of markets. 
Before we describe the intuition for this result, notice 
that this outcome in area A is different from that in the 
one-area world. From Proposition 2, we know that if a is 
big, then the new technology is blocked in the one-area 
world if A is small. In a world with integrated markets, in 
which the areas have formed a free-trade union, and with 
a big, the new technology is not blocked (regardless of the 
size of X). 
The proof for this is as follows. We derive a contradic-
tion. Suppose a barrier is constructed in area A. By as-
sumption, there is no barrier in area B. Hence, producers 
in area B have a comparative advantage in the production 
of the manufactured good because they have access to the 
new technology whereas producers in A do not. Whether 
or not area B produces all the manufactured goods for both 
areas depends on the share of manufactured goods in the 
consumer budget. The assumption a > 1/2 insures that the 
share of manufactured goods in the consumer budget is 
sufficiently small so that production in area B is sufficient 
to accommodate the demand of the two areas.
2 All indi-
viduals in area A, therefore, produce food. Hence, the rep-
resentative skilled individual in area A gains nothing from 
blocking the new technology in A. Since the act of block-
ing the new technology wastes leisure time and delivers 
no benefit, the representative skilled individual is better off 
when the barrier is not erected. 
Consumption Barriers 
The basic result of this section is that trade between areas 
also eliminates consumption barriers, though this kind of 
barrier is more difficult to break than a production barrier. 
The reason an extension of markets places pressure on a 
consumption barrier in area A is that this barrier does not 
preclude those individuals in area B who are skilled in the 
old technology from exporting to A and thus diminishing 
the returns to skills in area A. 
In order to state our result, let v
bunion denote the return 
to the representative skilled individual in area A if there is 
a consumption barrier in A when A is integrated, or in a 
free-trade union, with area B. The return to the representa-
tive skilled individual in A if there is no barrier in A when 
A is in a free-trade union with area B is equal to the return 
to the representative skilled individual in area A when there 
is no barrier in A in the one-area world. Recall that this re-
turn was denoted v
n above. 
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose that 0 > Y~
A. For small enough 
r, there exists a point Xe (0where Xis defined as in 
Proposition 2, such that ifX<X, then v
bunion > v




This result is illustrated in Chart 2. The proposition 
states that for certain parameters the representative skilled 
individual is better off with a barrier than without one. This 
proposition, together with Proposition 2, implies that inte-
grating the markets in A with those in B will also eliminate 
consumption barriers under certain conditions. To show 
this, we have included in Chart 2 not only the curves v
bnion 
2We have not worked out the case of a < 1/2. Calculating equilibrium in the inte-
grated world given a barrier in area A and no barrier in area B is somewhat complex 
in this case. If a is small, then area B consumes most of the manufacturing goods it 
produces. This limits the pressure on the skilled group in A from exports from B. But 
when a is small, there is little incentive to erect barriers in the one-area world. (See 
Proposition 2.) Hence, when a is small, trade is less powerful in eliminating barriers, 
but these barriers are less likely to be there in the first place. 
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and v
n, but also the curve v
b from Chart 1. Recall that v
b 
is the utility of the representative skilled individual in area 
A under a barrier in the one-area world. As seen in Chart 
2, if X < X, the skilled group in A erects a consumption 
barrier in both the one-area world and the union with B. 
However, if X e (X,A), then the skilled group in area A 
erects a consumption barrier in the one-area world but not 
in the union with area B. Hence, joining the free-trade 
union eliminates barriers to new technology in area A in 
this case. 
It is worthwhile discussing why v
bnion < v
b for X < X" 
(and a strict inequality for a range of X below X"). We will 
show that if there is a consumption barrier in A when a 
union is formed, and ifX< X", then skilled individuals in 
area B will produce the manufactured good with the old 
technology for export to area A. This will depress the utili-
ty to skilled individuals in A. 
That skilled individuals in area B will produce the man-
ufactured good with the old technology for export to area 
A can be seen as follows. Suppose to the contrary that they 
do not export the manufactured good when there is a free-
trade union and a consumption barrier in A. Then there is 
no trade between area A and area B. The equilibrium allo-
cation in area A is the same as that in the one-area case 
with a barrier. The equilibrium allocation in area B is the 
same as that in the one-area case with no barrier. Each in-
dividual in area B earns an income of one food unit. (Such 
individuals can use their unit labor endowment to produce 
one food unit or y units of the manufactured good at a 
price of l/y.) Suppose instead that a skilled individual in 
B produces the manufactured good with the old technolo-
gy for export to area A. Since, by assumption, X < X", the 
manufactured good price in A exceeds 1/9. (See Proposi-
tion 1.) Since output equals 0 units and price exceeds 1/0, 
the income of a representative skilled individual exceeds 
one food unit. Hence, a skilled individual in B can earn 
higher income by exporting. This contradicts the earlier as-
sertion that there is an equilibrium with no exports. Be-
cause of exports from B to A and the resulting decrease in 
the manufactured good price, v
bnion < v
b for X < X" (and 
a strict inequality for a range of X below X"), as illustrated 
in Chart 2. 
Recall that in the one-area case, at the point X, skilled 
individuals in A are indifferent between erecting and not 
erecting the barrier. Since joining a free-trade union re-
duces the return to erecting a barrier, but has no effect on 
the return to not erecting a barrier, skilled individuals are 
better off without a barrier at this point. This is also true 
for X just below X. Therefore, for X in this range, con-
sumption barriers are not erected when there is a union, but 
they are erected without a union. Extension of markets re-
duces barriers. 
We conclude this section by discussing the claim that 
it is more difficult for trade to eliminate a consumption 
barrier than a production barrier. To see this, we show that 
there are conditions under which forming a free-trade 
union with B eliminates production barriers but not con-
sumption barriers. Assume, then, that a > 1/2. Then from 
Proposition 3 we know that forming a union eliminates 
production barriers. It may not eliminate consumption bar-
riers. From Proposition 4 (and Chart 2) we know that if X 
is small, then v
bnion > v
n. In this case, consumption barriers 
are erected. 
Why Competition Spreads 
If competition reduces resistance to new technology, why 
would skilled groups ever agree to an extension of mar-
kets, as they sometimes do? Because, sometimes, letting 
goods move between areas is in the best interests of all 
skilled groups. Here we demonstrate that by studying the 
question in a slightly modified version of our model. 
Thus far the model has had two periods: period 1 and 
period 2. This section adds an additional period, period 0, 
that precedes the two periods covered in the previous anal-
ysis. In period 0, decisions are made regarding whether or 
not the two areas form a free-trade union. (More on this in-
stitution-building stage below.) 
This section also adds many manufactured goods. As 
mentioned above, to show that skilled groups may agree 
to an extension of markets requires introducing many man-
ufactured goods. Here is the reason why. Recall the analy-
sis of the one-area world. Under the conditions of Proposi-
tion 2, if X is small, then skilled individuals resist the new 
technology. Consider the impact on utilities in area A of 
forming a free-trade union with area B. If the union results 
in a dismantling of barriers, then skilled individuals in A 
lose rents. But unskilled individuals in A are better off. 
Hence, some groups gain from extending markets; some 
lose. However, this need not always be the case. In partic-
ular, if there are many manufactured goods, then it is pos-
sible for all groups to be better off with a free-trade union 
than without one. The trade union case Pareto-dominates 
the alternative of no trade union. In this case, since every 
individual in the economy is better off with a free-trade 
union, we can be confident, without specifying the details 
of the political process, that a union is set up in period 0. 
Hence, we keep the institution-building stage in the back-
ground. 
9 One Area With Many Manufactured Goods 
Before proceeding to discuss the formation of a free-trade 
union, we need to briefly study the one-area world with 
many manufactured goods, that is, with k > 1. We some-
times refer to the different manufacturing goods as differ-
ent industries. Recall that in the first period, each skilled 
group / chooses whether or not to erect a barrier; al -
{b,n}. Let a = (alya2,...,ak) be the vector of choices made 
in the first period. We call this the barrier set. In the sec-
ond period, there is a competitive equilibrium given the 
barrier set a selected in the first period. 
• Equilibrium in the Second Period 
We begin by determining the competitive equilibrium for 
a given barrier set a. In order to state the following propo-
sition about equilibrium, we need to define a critical level 
of X. We denote this level by X', where X' = k( 1-a) -f 
[(a+£-l)0+(l-a)]. Recall that X is the fraction of the pop-
ulation that is in some skilled group and that T| = X/k is the 
fraction that is in some particular industry i? We can now 
state 
PROPOSITION 5. Take as given some barrier set a in which 
some of the technologies have a barrier and others do not. 
IfX < X', the unique equilibrium is as follows. If technolo-
gy i has a barrier—that is, a{ - b—then pt= 1; individ-
uals in skilled group i completely specialize in the produc-
tion of good i; and individuals who are not skilled in any 
of the goods with a barrier also produce good i. If tech-
nology i does not have a barrier—that is, ai - n—then 
pi - 1/y and the individuals in skilled group i have the 
same consumption and utility as unskilled individuals. 
This result is a generalization of Proposition 1 to the 
case of k > 1. To simplify matters, for the rest of this sec-
tion we assume that X < X' (the case with the greatest in-
centive to erect barriers). 
• Resistance 
We now discuss how the barrier set is determined. Each 
group i makes its barrier choice to maximize group utility 
taking as given the barrier choices of the other groups. An 
equilibrium barrier set (af,a\) is a set such that aj 
e {b,n} is optimal for i given the choices of the other 
groups. This is the standard Nash equilibrium concept. 
Determining the Nash equilibrium is easy when X < X' be-
cause the optimal strategy of each group is independent of 
what the other groups do. In other words, each skilled 
group has a dominant strategy. 
PROPOSITION 6. Assume that X<X\Q> Y
L_CC)/*, and r is 
small. Each skilled group has a dominant strategy to erect 
a barrier. The unique equilibrium is for a barrier to be 
erected in each industry. 
A proof of this result is in the Appendix. This result is 
the extension of Proposition 2 to the case of multiple man-




 is a generaliza-
tion of the condition 0 > Y~
A in Proposition 2. 
The next proposition is the key welfare result in this 
section. 
PROPOSITION 7. Maintain the assumptions of the preced-
ing proposition. 7/9 e (Y
0-00^;/^), then all skilled groups 
are strictly better off with no barriers in any industry than 
with barriers in every industry. 
The Appendix contains the proof. This proposition 
highlights the key difference between the cases of k = 1 
and k > 1. With k= 1, the interval specified 
in the proposition disappears. With k> 1, there exists a pa-
rameter region in which all individuals are better off with 
no barriers in any industry than with barriers in every in-
dustry. 
Taken together, Propositions 6 and 7 show that if 0 E 
the unique equilibrium involves barriers 
in every industry, though a situation with no barriers is 
strictly preferred by all. This situation is analogous to the 
well-known prisoner's dilemma. In the next section, we 
show that trade can be used as a device to achieve the co-
operative outcome in which no barriers are constructed. 
Two Areas With Trade 
We now assume that areas A and B are integrated and ask 
what equilibria are possible. We assume that the two areas 
are identical, including their resistance technologies. 
The skilled groups in the two areas all move simultane-
ously in period 1 when choosing to erect a barrier or not. 
Each skilled group takes as given the choices of all the oth-
er skilled groups in the two areas when making its choice. 
For example, when choosing its action afe {b,n}, skilled 
group 1 in area A takes as given the actions a*,..., a£of 
the other skilled groups in area A and the actions af, of,..., 
tff, of the skilled groups in area B. Our result is 
PROPOSITION 8. Suppose that k > 1 and that the barriers 
are production barriers. If the two areas are integrated, 
3Note that for k = 1, the formula for X in this section reduces to that defined earli-
er. Because we like to think of & as being large, it is worth noting that X is bounded 
above zero and monotonically declines to (l-a)/9 > 0 as k goes to infinity. 
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then there exists an equilibrium in which no skilled group 
erects a barrier. 
The proof is straightforward. Consider the problem of 
a particular skilled group in a particular area. By symme-
try, we can examine skilled group 1 in area A. Suppose 
that all other skilled groups in both areas choose not to 
erect a barrier. Suppose skilled group 1 in area A erects a 
barrier. It is easy to see that this barrier has no bite. In the 
resulting competitive equilibrium, all production of good 
1 will occur in area B where there is no restriction to pro-
ducing good 1 with the new technology. Area B can pro-
duce enough for both areas since the good makes up less 
than one-half of the share of the consumer budget. (This 
follows from k > 1.) Hence, the barrier does not raise the 
incomes of skilled individuals in area A. But imposing this 
barrier requires that group 1 give up some leisure time. 
This barrier thus entails costs but delivers no benefits. 
Hence, skilled group 1 in area A will strictly prefer not to 
erect a barrier. Analogously, all other groups strictly prefer 
not to erect barriers. Hence, it is a Nash equilibrium for 
there to be no barriers. 
We can now state the main result of this section: 
PROPOSITION 9. Maintain the parameter assumptions of 
Proposition 6. If there is no free-trade union, then the 
unique equilibrium is for a barrier to be erected in every 
industry. With a union, there exists an equilibrium with no 
barriers. All individuals are strictly better off with the 
union than without it. 
We should point out that there can exist multiple equi-
libria in the free-trade union case. For example, under the 
assumptions of Proposition 9, there also exists an equilib-
rium of the union case in which all skilled groups erect 
barriers. Note, however, that everyone is better off in the 
no-barrier equilibrium than in the barrier equilibrium. It is 
reasonable to expect that the Pareto-superior no-barrier 
equilibrium will be selected instead of the Pareto-inferior 
barrier equilibrium. 
Examples of How Competition 
Reduces Resistance 
In this section, we present a few brief industry case stud-
ies in which the extent of the market for a good explains, 
in large part, we think, the extent to which new ways of 
producing the good are resisted. We use the theory devel-
oped so far to examine episodes of technological change in 
three industries: the advent of lean production in the world 
automobile industry, the introduction of a growth hormone 
in the U.S. dairy industry, and a discovery about the spac-
ing of wall studs in the U.S. construction industry. These 
three episodes present an interesting mix in the sense that 
in the construction industry, because of the nature of the 
good, the extent of the market is narrow; in the auto in-
dustry, the extent of the market has been narrowed by pol-
icy; and in the dairy industry, the extent of the market is 
great.
4 
Lean Production of Cars 
Let's start with the world automobile industry. 
A rough outline of some of the major technological 
changes in this industry over the past 20 years or so is as 
follows. Beginning over 30 years ago, a new approach to 
producing cars was taking shape in Japan. These new 
methods revolutionized the production of automobiles. 
Womack, Jones, and Roos (1991) describe the features of 
this production technology and call it lean production. 
They, and others, document that large gains in productivi-
ty follow from adopting the new technology. The response 
to these new methods by automobile makers has differed 
widely around the world. For example, the new methods 
are now widely employed in the United States. In contrast, 
European car makers have lagged behind their U.S. com-
petitors in adopting these Japanese methods. 
Why has the experience in the United States been dif-
ferent from that in Europe? We give an interpretation in 
terms of the model. Then we spend the rest of the section 
defending the interpretation. 
In terms of the model, we think of Japan as area B. 
More precisely, we think of Japan as area B when the new 
technology (lean production) is freely available in B. We 
imagine the United States as area A—in the case where A 
is integrated with B. We take Europe to be area A in the 
case where there is no integration. With this interpretation, 
the new methods were adopted in the United States be-
cause resistance was less in the United States than in Eu-
rope—because the United States was more open to trade 
competition with Japan than was Europe.
5 In order to de-
4We should note that a number of recent studies have shown a close relationship 
between the degree of international competition faced by an industry in a country and 
that industry's productivity growth in that country. Notable examples are the studies by 
McKinsey Global Institute (1993a,b). 
5Part of this interpretation is not new. Many observers of this industry attribute the 
more rapid diffusion of lean production in the United States to the U.S. market being 
more open to imports from Japan than is the European market. The McKinsey (1993a,b) 
studies, the Womack, Jones, and Roos (1991) project, and many other people argue that 
the fact that the U.S. market was open to imports forced the domestic industry to re-
structure and adopt the new techniques. What these observers have not done is discuss 
how the trade regime may affect the resistance activities of groups. 
11 fend this interpretation, we need to document two things: 
first, that the United States was more open to competition 
and, second, that this led to less resistance to the new 
methods. 
The claim that the U.S. automobile market is more 
open than Europe's is fairly easy to substantiate. Japanese-
produced cars have penetrated the U.S. market to a sub-
stantial degree as compared to the European market. The 
accompanying table presents evidence on this point. In 
1992, about 1.58 million automobiles were produced in 
Japan and then exported to the United States.
6 Exports of 
Japanese-produced cars to the United States accounted for 
nearly 20 percent of car sales in the United States in 1992.
7 
This can be contrasted with the shares of Japanese-pro-
duced cars exported to the markets of European countries. 
The table groups the European countries into those coun-
tries that have automobile industries producing over 1 mil-
lion cars and those countries that have small or nonexistent 
industries. The Japanese share of the market in auto-pro-
ducing European countries is quite small relative to the 
Japanese share of the U.S. market. For example, in Italy, 
the share is only 0.1 percent; in France, it is still quite 
small at 2.9 percent. However, in the countries of Europe 
without a large industry to protect, the Japanese market 
share is huge. In Norway, it is actually 50 percent. This 
table suggests that Japanese cars are superior to European-
produced cars since when consumers have a choice be-
tween the two (because there is no domestic industry to 
protect), they buy Japanese cars.
8 We can infer that there 
must be substantial barriers to the inflow of Japanese cars 
in Spain, France, and Italy—and, for that matter, even the 
United Kingdom and Germany.
9 
The second thing to document in defense of our model 
interpretation of this industry is that there was less resis-
tance to the new lean production methods in the United 
States than in Europe. We discuss two issues related to 
this. First, we show that the new methods have been more 
rapidly adopted in the United States than in Europe. Then 
we present some discussion that the reason has something 
to do with less resistance in the United States. 
It is now conventional wisdom that the U.S. automo-
bile industry has undergone a major transformation. The 
word renaissance is often used to describe the changes in 
the U.S. automobile industry. A substantial portion of the 
cars produced in the United States (25 percent in 1992) 
are made in Japanese transplant factories using the latest 
technology. In addition, Ford and Chrysler, and to a lesser 
extent General Motors, have made great strides in adopt-
ing the new methods in their factories. This is the conclu-
sion of the MIT International Motor Vehicle Program, a 
five-year, $5 million research project on the automobile 
industry that culminated with the publication of the influ-
ential book, The machine that changed the world: The 
story of lean production, by Womack, Jones, and Roos 
(1991). For example, they write (pp. 86-87) that 
Average American performance—under unrelenting pressure 
from the Japanese transplants in North America—has im-
proved dramatically, partly by closing the worst plants, such 
as Framingham, and partly by adopting lean production tech-
niques at others. 
They note that the productivity level and output quality of 
Ford plants in the United States are now equal to those of 
the Japanese transplants in the United States. 
But there is no talk of a renaissance of the European 
auto industry. At this point, only a small fraction of pro-




 And the production by the six volume producers 
in Europe is anything but lean. Womack, Jones, and Roos 
(1991, p. 87) also write that "Europe, by contrast, has not 
yet begun to close the competitive gap." A recent report 
prepared by the McKinsey Global Institute (1993a) makes 
the same point. It estimates that labor productivity in Ger-
man auto plants is only 66 percent of that in U.S. auto 
plants. 
Resistance to lean production in Europe has often come 
from autoworker unions. These unions have resisted the 
flexible work practices and reduced job classifications that 
are hallmarks of the Japanese production organization, and 
they have tried to maintain the rigid work rules that have 
been a part of past union contracts. (See Kenney and Flor-
6This figure does not include the approximately 1.4 million cars produced in the 
United States by Japanese transplant factories such as the Toyota plant in Kentucky and 
the Honda plants in Ohio. The figure does include the 143 thousand cars produced in 
Japan in 1992 and sold under Chrysler and General Motors nameplates. 
7We use new-car registrations in 1992 as our measure of car sales in the table be-
cause this number is available for all of the countries listed in the table and the number 
of actual car sales in 1992 is not available for all of the countries. The two numbers are 
close. For example, the number of actual car sales in the United States in 1992 was 
about 8.21 million compared to new-car registrations of about 8.06 million. 
8On this point, it is worth noting that in the U.S. market where the Japanese and 
European firms are on an equal footing, the Japanese have huge sales while the Euro-
peans have virtually no sales, except in the small, high-end luxury-car market. 
9The U.S. market is by no means completely open to competition. The so-called 
voluntary export restraint agreements with Japan are a notable example of a U.S. trade 
barrier. 
10The number of cars built by Japanese firms in Europe will increase since a num-
ber of transplant factories are being built there. 
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Which Areas Are More Open to Competition? 
The U.S. and European Automobile Markets in 1992 
Thousands of New Cars 
Japanese 
Imported Imports as a % 
Country Produced Registered From Japan of Registrations 
United States  5,665  8,057  1,584  19.7 
European Countries 
With a Large Auto Industry 
Germany  4,864  3,930  452  11.5 
France  3,320  2,106  61  2.9 
Spain  1,799  985  36  3.7 
Italy  1,477  2,257  3  .1 
United Kingdom  1,292  1,594  153  9.6 
Without a Large Auto Industry 
Sweden  294  154  36  23.4 
Belgium  268  466  126  27.0 
Netherlands  94  494  117  23.7 
Austria  15  320  101  31.6 
Denmark  0  85  36  42.4 
Ireland  0  68  28  41.2 
Norway  0  60  30  50.0 
Switzerland  0  286  87  30.4 
Finland  0  68  25  36.8 
Source: Ward's Automotive Yearbook, 1993 
ida 1993, p. 315.) Unions have resisted the closure of out-
dated factories and layoffs. In the face of the resistance to 
layoffs, Volkswagen is attempting to be more productive 
by moving to a four-day workweek. But according to 
Daniel Jones (one of the authors of the MIT study cited 
above), in reference to Volkswagen's German operations, 
"You cannot manage 50,000 people at one site in a lean 
way" (Europe's car makers, 1994, p. 22). 
But has autoworker resistance been less severe in the 
United States than in Europe? One piece of evidence is 
the response in the United States and Europe to the threat 
of Japanese transplants. Both unions and management of 
domestic automobile firms have tried to block the estab-
lishment of Japanese transplant factories within their own 
countries. They have done this by arguing that production 
by transplant factories should be counted as imports and 
subject to the import quotas imposed on the Japanese. Pro-
ponents of such a policy have never made any headway in 




A Growth Hormone for Cows 
We next use the model to interpret the events surrounding 
a recent major change in the U.S. dairy industry. 
A rough outline of the facts is as follows. Some years 
ago, the Monsanto Company genetically engineered bo-
vine somatotropin, a naturally occurring hormone in cows. 
When this hormone is injected into cows, milk production 
increases in the range of from 10 to 15 percent (Marion 
and Wills 1990). Many groups have opposed the use of 
the hormone. For example, some opponents of the new 
1
1
 The European Union later abandoned this policy. There are now no limits on the 
production of Japanese cars in Europe, and transplant production is expanding there. 
13 technology have raised the issue of a health risk to justify 
a ban of the new technology. 
In the United States, attempts to block the growth hor-
mone have occurred at both the federal and state levels. At 
the federal level, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
has jurisdiction over the approval process. Efforts to block 
this hormone at the federal level have therefore involved 
lobbying the FDA. At the level of individual states, the ef-
forts to block the new technology have taken many forms. 
One form—used in Vermont and Wisconsin, for exam-
ple—is to try to enact state laws that simply ban produc-
tion with the new technology. 
After a long battle, the hormone was finally approved 
by the FDA. Commercial use began in the United States 
in early 1994. The efforts in individual states to enact laws 
prohibiting the use of the hormone have also failed. We 
use the model to offer an interpretation of why states have 
failed to enact such laws. 
In terms of the model, we think of areas A and B as cor-
responding to states in the United States. We imagine the 
model situation in which there are no restrictions on trade 
between areas A and B. This is because the Constitution 
of the United States has been interpreted in such a way as 
to prohibit the states from interfering with interstate trade. 
Individual states ultimately did not enact laws prohibit-
ing the use of this new technology in the state because in-
terstate trade reduced the incentive for interest groups with-
in a state to lobby the state legislature to pass such laws. 
For example, suppose that the Wisconsin legislature passed 
a law which blocked Wisconsin dairy farmers from using 
the new technology. If other states did not block the new 
technology, then imports of low-priced milk produced with 
the new technology would flow into Wisconsin. In addi-
tion, Wisconsin would no longer be competitive in export-
ing milk to other states. Hence, this law would not benefit 
Wisconsin dairy farmers. Suppose instead that the Wiscon-
sin law banned consumption of milk produced with the 
new technology, but did not ban production, and suppose 
that Wisconsin is the only state with such a law. Wiscon-
sin dairy farmers would be free to use the new technology 
for export to other markets. As discussed earlier, in such 
a situation, there would be an incentive for old-technology 
producers in other areas to export milk made without the 
growth hormone to the area with the ban, and this would 
limit the benefit of the policy to the old-technology firms 
in Wisconsin. 
In sum, the bovine growth hormone case is an excel-
lent example of how the ability to trade between areas can 
reduce barriers to new technology. 
More Room for Wall Studs 
Finally, let's look at an advance in the U.S. construction 
industry. 
Because of advances in science, construction engineers 
have realized that safety does not require wall studs to be 
as close together as had been thought. Placing wall studs 
(in non-load-bearing partitions) every 24 inches is just as 
safe as the old standard distance, every 16 inches. The 
homes with 24-inch placement are clearly not identical to 
those with 16-inch placement, but regarding the ability of 
the home to bear stress and weight, a national commission 
reported, "Experts agree that... [spacing] every 24 inches 
would be just as safe. There seems to be no . . . scientific 
data to refute these facts" (National Commission on Urban 
Problems 1968, p. 258). 
Using 24-inch placement saves on labor costs and re-
duces materials costs by 33 percent. Moreover, the cost of 
adopting the method is zero. It simply entails reducing re-
dundancies in the previous method. Yet in many U.S. 
towns, 16-inch placement continues. Why? We give an in-
terpretation in terms of the model. 
We think of areas A and B as corresponding to differ-
ent towns in the United States. Since housing services are 
a good that cannot be traded, we imagine the model situa-
tion in which the markets of A and B are not integrated. 
Given this situation, we expect that resistance to the new 
methods may be high in a given area. Moreover, if one ar-
ea fails to block the new methods, we do not expect that 
this will put pressure on other areas to change their build-
ing codes. 
That it is resistance to new technology that blocks 24-
inch placement in some towns is supported by the work 
of Oster and Quigley (1977). They find that 24-inch place-
ment is not used in some towns because local building 
codes prohibit its use. Moreover, they find evidence that 
such restrictions are the work of building trade unions who 
believe, presumably, that 24-inch placement will mean 
fewer jobs. 
Concluding Comments 
We conclude with three comments, the first about related 
literature, the next about the model, and the last about fu-
ture research. 
When we showed that competition reduces resistance, 
we studied resistance to new technology and how the ex-
tension of markets, or the freer movement of goods be-
tween areas, influences this activity. To show this, we ex-
ogenously joined area A to area B and examined the conse-
quences on technology adoption in area A. This thought 
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experiment is similar to that performed by Adam Smith 
when he argued that extending markets would result in 
greater division of labor. 
This analysis is not to be confused with research that 
examines resistance to trade, for example, models in which 
groups lobby for tariffs and the like. (See, for example, 
Magee, Brock, and Young 1989 and Grossman and Help-
man 1994.) Our analysis where we showed that skilled 
groups might agree to join a free-trade union is related to 
that research. 
It is worth mentioning that it is really the threat of 
goods moving between areas that leads to reductions in re-
sistance activities. Goods themselves do not have to move. 
For example, suppose that in the model above, area A is 
integrated with area B, but there is no movement of goods 
between the areas. It does not follow that because the vol-
ume of trade is zero, closing the areas off from each other 
will have no impact on the economies. In fact, this action 
will typically lead to increased resistance in area A. The 
point, then, is that the volume of trade may not be a good 
indicator of the role trade is playing in producing wealth. 
So, for example, the increase in tariffs during the 1930s 
may have played an important role in the Great Depres-
sion even though trade volume before the tariff increases 
accounted for only about 5 percent of output. 
Finally, a word about future research. The very large 
differences in income per capita across countries are well 
known and well documented. (See, for example, Parente 
and Prescott 1993.) We think that these large differences 
are due in large part to differences in the technologies that 
are employed in the countries. One hypothesis for the dif-
ference in technology use is that the extent of markets dif-
fers across these countries (because of, for example, dif-
ferences in tariff policy and differences in transportation 
infrastructure) and, hence, resistance to new technology as 
well. (For a different theory of resistance to new technolo-
gy, see Krusell and Rios-Rull 1992. For another interest-
ing model explaining differences in technology use, see 
Romer 1994.) Ultimately, then, we hope that this line of 
inquiry contributes to the literature on the "problem of eco-
nomic development" (Lucas 1988; Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil 1992; Schmitz 1993; and Parente and Prescott 1994). 
We hope this article has taken some small steps toward un-
derstanding and solving that problem. 
Appendix 
Proofs of Propositions 2, 6, and 7 
Here we develop the proofs for several propositions discussed 
in the preceding paper. 
Proof of Proposition 2 
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that 0 > Y
1^. For small enough r, 
there exists <2 point X e (X\X"), such that ifX < X, then v
b > 
while ifX>X, then v
b < v
n. 
Proof. The first step in the proof is to compare the skilled-indi-
vidual utility with and without a technology barrier for the case 
in which X < X'. 
Under the barrier, the price of the manufactured good is p
b = 
1 for such X, and this implies that the income of skilled individ-
uals is 9 units of food. (Recall that a skilled individual produces 
0 units of the manufactured good.) Given the Cobb-Douglas 
form for u(x,y), the share of income spent on food is a and the 
share spent on the manufactured good is (3 = 1 - a. Hence, the 
consumption levels for a skilled individual are x











Note that the utility from leisure is h{\-r) because the individu-
al must allocate r units of leisure time to resistance activities in 
this case. 
In the no-barrier case, the price is p
n = 1/y and income is 
one unit of food. This implies consumption levels of x
n = a and 
y






Note that the utility in the no-barrier case is independent of X. 
Note also that the utility of a skilled individual is the same as the 
utility of an unskilled individual. This follows because the old 
technology is not used. 
For the case of X < X', the ratio of utilities in the two cases 
(A3) vV = [Qmhil-rWKl). 
The first term on the right side of equation (A3) is greater than 
1 by assumption. The second term is less than 1. However, it is 
arbitrarily close to 1 for small enough r. Hence, v
h > v
n for 
small enough r, as claimed. 
Next, suppose that X > X". In this case, with the barrier, the 
equilibrium price is p
b = 1/0 and the equilibrium income is one 
15 unit of food. Without a barrier, the income is the same, at one 
unit of food, but the price of manufactured goods is lower, at 
p
n = l/y. Hence, the utility from goods consumption is strictly 
higher without a barrier. Since the utility of leisure is also high-
er without a barrier [(/*( 1) > /z(l-r)], overall utility is also high-
er, v" > v
b, as claimed. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6 
PROPOSITION 6. Assume that X<X\d> Y
0-007*, and r is small 
Each skilled group has a dominant strategy to erect a barrier. 
The unique equilibrium is for a barrier to be erected in each in-
dustry. 
Proof. We need to show it is a dominant strategy for each skilled 
group to erect a new technology barrier. By symmetry, it is suf-
ficient to consider the choice of skilled group 1. 
Suppose this skilled group takes as given that in m of indus-
tries 2 through k there are barriers and in k - m - 1 of indus-
tries 2 through k there are no barriers. (By symmetry, it doesn't 
matter which of the industries are in the two groups.) 
Let v
b(m) denote the utility of a person in skilled group 1 
when there is a barrier to new technology in industry 1 given m. 
Under the assumption X < Proposition 5 says that the price 
of good 1 is px = 1, as is the price of the other m manufactured 
goods with a barrier. The price of the remaining k-m - 1 man-
ufactured goods with no barrier is l/y. The income of an indi-
vidual in skilled group 1 is 0 units of food. The food consump-
tion of such an individual is x = oc0. (The price of food is 1, 
and a is the share of income spent on food.) Consumption of 
manufactured goods with a barrier is p0, where p = (l-oc)/k. 
(The price of such a good is 1, and the share of income spent 
on a particular manufactured good is p.) Consumption of manu-
factured goods without a barrier is py0. (The price of such a 
good is l/y.) The utility of an individual in skilled group 1 is, 
therefore, 





Let v\{m) denote the utility of a person in skilled group 1 
when there is no barrier to new technology in industry 1 and 
when m other industries have erected barriers and k-m - 1 
have not. Without a barrier, the price of good 1 is = l/y 
while the prices of the other goods are the same as described 
above. The income of an individual in skilled group 1 falls to 1. 
That person's consumption of food in this case is x = a. His or 
her consumption of the m manufactured goods with a barrier is 
P, and his or her consumption of the k - m goods without a bar-
rier (including good 1) is Py. The utility of an individual in 






The ratio of the utilities of an individual in skilled group 1 
when there is a barrier and when there is no barrier is 
(A6) v*(m)/v» = (0/V
3) [h( 1 -r)]/h( 1). 
Note that in this ratio there are no terms involving m, the num-
ber of other skilled groups that erect barriers. Hence, whether or 
not v\(m) > v J (m) (that is, whether or not the ratio (A6) is greater 
than 1) does not depend on the actions of the other skilled 
groups. Recall that P = (1-a)/k; if 0 > y
0-007* and if r is small, 
then skilled group 1 chooses to erect a barrier, as claimed. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 7 
PROPOSITION 7. Maintain the assumptions of the preceding 
proposition. If 0 E (f-v-Wrf-v), then all skilled groups are 
strictly better off with no barriers in any industry than with 
barriers in every industry. 
Proof Suppose that skilled group 1 erects a new technology 
barrier and all the remaining k - 1 skilled groups do so as well. 
Then the utility of skilled group 1 is given by v
b(k-1), where 
v\(m) is defined by (A4) above. If skilled group 1 does not erect 
a barrier and no other skilled group erects a barrier, then utility 
is VJ(0). The ratio of these utilities is 
(A7) VJ(£-1)/V|(0) = (E/^MI-RWIL). 
The second term on the right side of (A7) is less than 1 since 
r > 0. The first term is less than 1 if 
(A8) 0 < y
1_a. 
If (A8) holds, then skilled group 1 is strictly better off when no 
barriers are erected than when every barrier is erected. Q.E.D. 
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